In 2015, parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) formally closed negotiations on measures to maintain and enhance the carbon storage capacity of forests in developing countries, commonly referred to as 'REDD+'. This unusual and largely symbolic gesture seemingly signals that UNFCCC parties consider the international set of rules on REDD+ a 'job done', at least for the time being. This article reflects on the outcome of these negotiations and on the related law-making process, arguing that REDD+ may be regarded as the first ripe fruit in the pledge-and-review architecture recently enshrined in the Paris Agreement. REDD+ is therefore used in this article as a lens to understand how the new architecture for climate change governance may work, as well as challenges facing its implementation. In doing so, the article aims to shine a light on the path ahead for the Paris Agreement, making predictions on challenges likely to emerge with its implementation, the solutions that may be adopted, as well as areas where more international rules may be needed.
INTRODUCTION
The Paris Agreement 1 adopted in December 2015 enshrines and perfects in treaty form the bottom-up 'pledge-and-review' 2 architecture that emerged since the ill-fated fifteenth
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 3 (UNFCCC) in 2009 . 4 This architecture relies on parties unilaterally declaring the action they intend to undertake to reduce their emissions, which is in turn to be subjected to a review process. In this context, the international climate change bureaucracy works as a notary collecting, and eventually enabling the review of the implementation of parties' pledged action. This bottom-up architecture leaves a very wide margin of discretion to States on how to contribute to the endeavour of tackling climate change. As such, there is a stark contrast between this new architecture and the 'targets-and-timetables' one embedded in the Kyoto Protocol, 5 which contemplates specific emissions targets for some parties, as well as timetables for their achievement, and a procedure to sanction lack of compliance.
While the adoption of a new approach to international climate governance was a matter of necessity, given the toppling of the approach embedded in the Kyoto Protocol, 6 the recent adoption of the Paris Agreement calls for a reflection on the challenges that may be encountered in operationalizing a bottom-up pledge-and-review architecture. In this connection, there is no need to look much further afield. Between 2005 and 2015, UNFCCC parties have built a bottom-up, pledge-and-review architecture to address emissions from the forest sector in developing countries, 7 commonly referred to with the acronym 'REDD+'.
The REDD+ architecture aims to enable developing countries to reduce forest emissions (by cutting down deforestation, forest degradation and sustainable forest management) and increase forest carbon sequestration (through afforestation and reforestation) on a voluntary basis. 8 According to its early proponents, REDD+ was expected to draw 'developing country
Parties towards emission reductions', by means of an 'equitable expansion of the market systems initiated following the Kyoto Protocol'. 9 More specifically, the REDD+ architecture was expected to establish an international system enabling developing countries to reduce emissions on a voluntary basis, with developed countries providing them with the finance to do so, while appropriating carbon offsets, against the backdrop of the targets and timetables embedded in the Kyoto Protocol. 10 The rationale was to reduce emissions in what seemed at the time a relatively cheap, fast and cost-effective way, in a sector that required little 6 As argued for example in D. be drawn from the design and the implementation of the REDD+ architecture for the long regulatory journey that parties to the climate regime are about to embark on to operationalize the Paris Agreement.
BOTTOM-UP PLEDGE-AND-REVIEW ARCHITECTURES
The Paris Agreement has brought to completion the pledge-and-review architecture that first 
A MARKET BASED APPROACH TO CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION
Ever since the dawn of international climate change governance, States have toyed with idea of adopting a market-based approach to facilitate the reduction of emissions and gather the finance necessary to do so, through the involvement of private investors. 34 For better or worse, emissions trading is the policy tool upon which they have decided to focus their attention.
The top-down targets-and-timetables architecture for international climate change governance enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol relied on a market-based approach to climate change mitigation. While the Protocol did not prescribe the creation of a global carbon market, its overall architecture largely hinged on the idea that such a market would materialize, kick-starting the process for its realization, by encouraging the use of markedbased approaches to stimulate climate change mitigation. 35 The Kyoto Protocol did so by establishing the so-called flexibility mechanisms to help parties achieve their targets, consisting of international emission trading, as well as mechanisms to enable joint These challenges largely relate to the need to create the regulatory conditions for investors to finance emission reduction activities, to ensure the carbon integrity of emission reductions produced, as well as a cost-effective allocation of the resources available.
These challenges are well exemplified by the REDD+ architecture. When compared with the flexibility mechanisms established under the Kyoto Protocol, the REDD+ architecture is rather fragmented and patchy. UNFCCC parties are free to engage in REDD+ activities, and to resort to market-based approaches to support them, if they so choose. 38 Initially, REDD+ finance was largely expected to mainly derive from the creation of a new commodity, i.e.
REDD+ forest carbon credits. These credits were to be purchased by developed countries seeking to meet their emission reduction obligations, as well as by non-State actors with emission reduction obligations under domestic and/or regional law. other option but for REDD+ finance to come from aid budgets. While this may have been an acceptable interim solution to build the conditions to carry out REDD+ activities, in the long run there is a need to ensure the involvement of the private sector to scale up REDD+ finance. 57 The adoption of a market-based approach, and the inclusion of REDD+ credits in existing emission trading schemes, would seem to be the obvious solution. Yet, no international rules on how this may happen have been agreed, and presently there is little clarity on the source of result-based payments for REDD+ in the long run.
In sum, the experience with REDD+ seems to suggest that, if parties decide to adopt a market-based approach to finance climate change mitigation endeavours, they need to establish a clear set of rules applicable to all parties from the outset. These rules should enable the tradability of credits across jurisdictions, and ensure the carbon integrity of emission reductions. The experience with REDD+ sets a limited precedent in this connection, and clearly demonstrates the challenges associated with a bottom-up regulatory framework that leaves these important details to the contracting between parties and/or institutions disbursing REDD+ payments. Parties' obligations concerning the provision of information and the review of implementation and compliance play a pivotal role in this regard, as explained next.
THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION
The provision of information is a crucial ingredient of international environmental agreements, both to ensure the monitoring of problems that parties seek to tackle -in the case of the climate regime, the emissions of greenhouse gases and their impacts -as well as to review parties' adherence to the obligations they have undertaken. 58 The mechanisms for the review of implementation and compliance tend to differ, depending on the nature of parties'
obligations. This is well exemplified by the climate regime. efforts rather difficult. 68 To be sure, this potential exists also under the Kyoto Protocol, and has led to much debate on rules concerning the accounting of emissions from land uses. 69 The related carbon integrity concerns have induced some developed countries to exclude emissions from land uses from generating credits tradable under their emission trading schemes. 70 Second, the reporting of REDD+ activities hinges on the setting of forest reference emission levels, which are the benchmarks against which parties' performance will be assessed, taking into account historical data and emissions parties reported in the past. 71 The fact that up until recently developing country parties only had very limited reporting obligations, however, entails that many do not have much historical data on their forest emissions and removals.
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There can therefore be a great deal of arbitrariness in a party's choice of its forest reference emissions level, which will be particularly difficult to assess. A 'facilitative, non-intrusive' expert assessment process 73 is meant to provide an opportunity to identify areas for technical improvement, 74 but no consequences are attached to negative assessments. It is up to those disbursing REDD+ finance to make their own mind on the reliability of reference levels, based on the information emerging from assessments. This remarkable margin of discretion raises the question of how to reconcile a bottom-up approach to climate change governance with the need to ensure the carbon integrity of the results they deliver. under the Paris Agreement, the adequacy of this review process will have to be scrutinized and brought into line with the new arrangements for the review of implementation and compliance made under that treaty. 79 On top of the consultation process above, parties seeking results-based payments for REDD+ need to comply with additional reporting obligations, which are subjected to a separate and dedicated technical review process. 80 How this process will work in practice, however, remains to be seen. 81 While the review process does not contemplate any consequences for lack of compliance, it would seem plausible to expect that these will result in ineligibility to receive REDD+ payments.
Institutions entrusted with the handling of REDD+ finance are likely to play an important role in this regard. Even though formally these institutions are not part of the review process, in fact, they will make their funding decisions on the basis of it, de facto applying consequences to lack of or poor compliance with parties' reporting obligations. Again, this architecture remains to be tested in practice. Still, it already seems clear that the bulk of finance for REDD+ is likely to be disbursed beyond the institutional remit of the climate regime. 82 As a result of this arrangement, crucial inter-State cooperation decisions are likely to be made beyond the institutional remit and scrutiny of the climate regime. While this is not ex se a tragedy, 83 the long-term implications of this approach for the overall carbon integrity of climate change action remain to be seen.
To sum up, the legal framework for the review of the implementation of parties' obligations in relation to REDD+ remains sketchy, and largely untested in practice. The nature of parties' obligations on REDD+ is yet to be understood, though it seems clear that at least some 78 Decision 1/CP.16, n. 8 above, at paragraphs 56-62 and Decision 14/CP.19, n. 30 above. 79 Paris Agreement, n. 1 above, Articles 13 and 15. 80 Decision 14/CP.19, n. 30 above at paragraphs 7-14.
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The reports are available at: <http://unfccc.int/national_reports/nonannex_i_natcom/reporting_on_climate_change/items/8722.php>. 82 Data on sources of REDD+ finance may be accessed at: < http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/themes/redd>. The Paris Agreement provides no explicit solutions to these questions. In its sole reference to REDD+, the agreement conveys parties' lack of appetite to re-engage in law-making on the issue, and to reconsider what already agreed, in spite of its perceived shortcomings. 84 Still, implementation of the Paris Agreement is expected to establish a level playing field, whereby all parties will report their emission reductions on equal terms and will be subjected to the same review processes. 85 This guidance may also include specific new rules concerning emissions from the land sector. The history of existing rules suggests that devising a unitary format to measure, report and verify emissions in this sector is likely to be hard and timeconsuming. 86 Experience accumulated with REDD+ thus far, however, indicates that also a country-driven approach to the measuring, reporting and verification presents challenges.
Implementation of the Paris Agreement is furthermore expected to deliver a unitary system to review implementation and compliance, building upon the extant framework established under the UNFCCC. 87 Even though in the short-to medium-term some differentiation is likely to remain, it would seem vital that over time all parties move towards a robust framework for reporting and reviewing the implementation of their obligations, along lines similar to those designed under the Kyoto Protocol. 84 Paris Agreement, n. 1 above, Article 5.2. 85 Ibid., Article 13. 86 See, e.g., Z.E. Bailey, n. 14 above ; and E. Trines, n. 14 above. 
THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS
International environmental law-making is characterized by 'autonomous institutional arrangements', with treaty bodies playing a fundamental role in development and interpretation of the law. 88 Even by these standards, the ten years long regulatory odyssey that characterized the making of REDD+ features peculiarities that may hold important lessons for secondary rule-making under the Paris Agreement.
While in 2009 the Copenhagen Accord emphatically called for the 'immediate establishment' of a REDD+ mechanism, 89 this statement of intention was never acted upon. UNFCCC parties were unable to agree on the establishment of an institution in charge to ensure coherence and coordination in the delivery of financial and technical support for REDD+.
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As a result, REDD+ has evolved without any overall institutional oversight.
Again, a comparison with the CDM architecture is revealing. The Kyoto Protocol specifically entrusted the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol to develop the rules 88 As explained in R. uncertainty. With no overall institution in charge, the bottom-up architecture on REDD+ seems to be in need for at least some orchestration to ensure the carbon integrity of REDD+ activities, the comparability between the results they deliver, as well as the most efficient use of the finite resources available to carry out REDD+ activities.
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The Paris Agreement has not significantly altered this state of affairs, but merely recognizes ex post facto the rules adopted by the UNFCCC COP, 115 without creating a dedicated institution in charge of overseeing REDD+ activities, and/or the related law-making process.
Experience with REDD+ therefore seems to point to the need to carefully steer the law- 
